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The broad scale changes to the Australian income support policy by Neo-liberals, such as Peter 
Saunders (Centre for Independent Studies), has led to arguments centering on generating 
savings and the prevention of so-called “welfare dependency”. Where once young people and 
unemployed people were targeted, the focus has now been extended to include people with a 
disability. The current Howard Government’s proposed changes to income support for people 
with a disability come into effect in July 2006. 
 
Underpinning these arguments are notions that selective income support for people with a 
disability is the most appropriate approach. This raises issues of adequacy, relevance, 
economic prospects and social well-being of people with a disability. Historically, the Australian 
system of income support has been dominated by selective approaches. Increasingly, attention 
has been drawn on the international level to the argument for an alternative and ideologically 
contrasting approach, that it, a universal Basic Income. This paper investigates the initial 
explorations into the adequacy of the current Australian selective approach to income support 
for people with a disability and the relevance of Basic income as an alternative. Determining the 
adequacy of each approach (selective and universal) provides a basis for extending the existing 
knowledge of social policy to incorporate disability. 
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Income support for people with a disability 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Income support policy for people with a disability in Australia has been dominated by highly 
selective approaches. Historically, policies around income support and employment have 
tended to ignore the reality of people with a disability subsequently leading to exclusion from 
work environments and providing no opportunities to engage in real work. People with a 
disability have had limited opportunity to access valued contribution and employment, due to 
factors such as institutionalisation. 
 
The changes to income support policy for people with a disability by the Howard government 
come into effect in July 2006. In this context, Neo-liberal supporters of these changes, for 
example Peter Saunders (Centre for Independent Studies), argue that such an approach will 
prevent so-called welfare dependency and generate savings. A key assumption of these 
arguments is that a selective approach is the most appropriate income support system for 
people with a disability. Few considerations have been given to questioning the adequacy of the 
dominant selective approach in relation to the economic and social well-being of people with a 
disability. This paper comes out of a current doctoral study on the initial explorations into the 
adequacy of the current Australian selective approach to income support for people with a 
disability. The paper also investigates the relevance of the universal Basic Income model as an 
alternative to traditional selective policy responses. The debates between selectivism and 
universalism have been explored in great detail in the social policy and income support 
literature. However, this paper contributes to the body of knowledge on income support in terms 
of the way disability is understood from selective and universal approaches and the changing 
nature of the disability construct in the current social policy context. 
 
 
Selectivism and Universalism 
 
 
In framing the discussion, a clear understanding of the relevance of the concepts of selectivism 
and universalism in relation to income support policy for people with a disability needs to be 
generated. Whilst not wanting to revisit old arguments around selectivism and universalism, the 
concepts are critical for understanding the basis of income support provisions within Australia, 
particularly in relation to disability pensions. The Australian welfare state is situated within the 
context of a western industrial capitalist economy and is the organising mechanism for social 
policy and program responses (Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven, 1999). The welfare state 
emerged as a response to address social and economic disadvantage for people experiencing 
poverty. Underpinning social policy decisions around the distribution and provision of resources 
are two distinctly different approaches, that is, the dichotomies of selectivism and universalism 
(Alcock, Payne & Sullivan, 2004). It is important in social policy to understand, as Alcock et al. 
(2004) suggested, the “method the state uses to provide income to the population in need” (p. 
154). The key points in this sense are method and content issues. By understanding the way a 
government makes policy determinations on income support (that is, who receives what 
payment or benefit) and associated normative values, issues of adequacy can be examined. 
This requires further extrapolation. 
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For Alcock et al. (2004), exploring the provisions of income support within a country constitutes 
examining the division between benefits, that is, universal (generous) and selective (minimal) 
benefits. The terms, universalism and selectivism are highly conflictual and contrasting 
concepts. Each approach contains ideological dichotomies and premises around the way 
resources are allocated and distributed within society (Alcock et al., 2004; Pollard, 1992; Pratt, 
1998). 
The concepts of universalism and selectivism, have generated intense debate within social 
policy arenas, in terms of their actual meanings and definitions. Alcock et al. (2004) highlighted 
that not only are different positions adopted, but also there are debates of differences across the 
concepts’ meanings. Whilst acknowledging these debates and complexities, for the purpose of 
the paper, the following definitions will be utilised. The concept, universalism, refers to 
payments provided to the whole population on the basis of citizenship and social justice (rights, 
equality and participation). Universal approaches have no requirements attached to the benefit 
and are provided regardless of (although not restricted to) income, categories or classifications, 
as in age, disability, race or class (Alcock et al., 2004; Pollard, 1992; Pratt, 1998). The key 
principle underpinning universal approaches is that the payment has no obligations for people to 
prove their need. Thus, universal payments have no means testing or targeting of beneficiaries. 
Universalism is in direct contrast to selectivism, as claimants are free from any form of 
stigmatism (Alcock et al., 2004; Pollard, 1992; Pratt, 1998). This is what makes universalism a 
significant and contrasting concept, given the propensity for traditional selective approaches to 
emphasise the so-called “deficiencies” of individuals. 
 
Selectivism centres on provisions that are allocated on the basis of means-testing and the 
targeting of people who are deemed to be in most need or vulnerable to poverty (Alcock et al., 
2004; Pollard, 1992; Pratt, 1998). Administrating selective approaches requires determinations 
around who is deemed to be “most in need” or “most deserving”. Thus, stringent eligibility 
criteria are generated, including poverty indicators and benchmarks, to assist in the decision-
making process (Alcock et al., 2004; Pratt, 1998). An income support system based on 
selectivism requires claimants to have proof of eligibility in order to be in receipt of any payment. 
Tighter controls and targeting are often directed at the claimants. In the current environment of 
mutual obligation, penalties are applied to claimants in the form of breaching, where an 
individual can have their payment suspended if they fail to fulfil their obligations. Selectivism, in 
comparison with universalism, requires highly complex administrative systems and processes 
as a means of ensuring claimants meet established requirements and adhere to the conditions 
of the payments (Alcock et al., 2004; Pratt, 1998; Tomlinson, 2000a, 2000b; Ziguras, Dufty & 
Considine, 2003). Australia, in comparison with other western countries, has the most highly 
complex and convoluted social security system in the world (Pratt, 1998). These definitions of 
universalism and selectivism are useful and adequate for the methodology of social policy, 
which comprise critical historical and comparative analytical components necessary for 
undertaking such a study. 
 
Aligning the research logic is critical as it is these distinct approaches and their central premises 
that inform my study on income support for people with a disability in Australia. To examine the 
Australian income support system relative to people with a disability and compare the selective 
approach with an alternative, the defining principles of selectivism and universalism need to be 
considered. In summary of this section, the Australian selective model of income support and 
Basic Income represent two distinctly different models. Each model contains a set of contrasting 
principles and ideological underpinnings, which upon analysis in their purest form, can be 
compared and contrasted, for determining the adequacy and relevance of each model. What 
tends to be ignored in the literature on selective income support policy responses and by 
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commentators, such as Saunders (2004), is that alternatives promoting universalism, such as 
the Basic Income, have had a long history in social policy research and analysis. It is notable 
that the dominant income support systems, predominantly western industrial countries (for 
example, the United States of America and Australia), have been based on selectivism and 
continue to remain unchallenged. Consequently, selective and highly targeted approaches to 
income support become established as the ideal. If changes are being introduced to the 
Australian Disability Support Pension, then the implications for the construct of disability require 
further exploration. Thus, the notions of selectivism and universalism need to be examined in 
relation to disability.  
 
 
Overview of the Australian Income Support System 
 
 
The focus of the Australian welfare state was on the provision of “minimum income security” 
through means-tested and targeted pensions and benefits, for those people most in need, as 
opposed to a universal income support system (Kennett, 2001, p. 120). Thus, the Australian 
model is based on a conservativist and residualist approach to welfare provision, in that it is 
highly targeted and selective and excludes those persons deemed to be outside approved 
criteria (Blaxter, 1976, p. 4; Kennett, 2001; Taphouse, 2001). Alongside philanthropic welfare 
relief from the 1900s, the Australian government had an increased role in the planning and 
implementation of income support policy responses to address poverty and disadvantage. 
These ideological distinctions require further examination to determine the way in which the 
targeted selective model of income support became the dominant approach. 
 
The Australian needs-based entitlement system of income support was further expanded in its 
comprehensiveness under the Chiffley Labour Government in 1947 (Tomlinson, 2001a, 2001b). 
Following the Second World War, both the Liberal and Labour Governments were also 
committed to increasing the safety net, expenditure and provision levels of the income support 
system (Tomlinson, 2001a, 2001b). Yet, by the late 1970s and 1980s, successive governments 
have strongly pursued a neo-liberal and conservative economic welfare agenda in order to 
curtail public expenditure in relation to the income support system. Broader transformational and 
structural changes, on an international level, have significantly influenced the push for economic 
fundamentalist agenda. These factors include the increased globalisation of financial markets 
and deregulation of finance and trade, increased international competition in the market, the 
floating of the Australian dollar in the 1980s, tariff cuts causing massive job losses in specific 
industries (for example, textile industry), and reduction of public sector expenditure (Stilwell, 
1994, 2002; Wheelwright, 1994). 
 
The current Howard Government recently proposed to extend mutual obligation activities of 
people receiving unemployment benefits, to incorporate those in receipt of the Disability Support 
Pension. Whilst a comprehensive analysis is unable to be undertaken at this point in time, 
clearly, some discussion on the implications is required. Underpinning the Howard Government 
stance are conservative and economic fundamentalist premises that purport the need to 
address the so called “inadequacies and deficits of the welfare system”. The McClure report 
provided the impetus and rationale for the government to advance these arguments on 
extending the mutual obligation categories criteria (Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000). 
Under the guise of “welfare reforms”, the report outlined a series of recommendations that 
would assist in the improvement of the welfare system’s operations that were consistent with 
broader global social and economic trends. That is, stringent accountability measures, 
generating efficiencies and streamlining perceived inefficient systems (Goodin et al., 1999; 
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Newman, 2000; Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000; Tomlinson, 2000a). Saunders 
(2004)  
 
The Howard Government adopted the recommendations outlined in the McClure Report as a 
platform for the support of a participatory income support model, which sought to prevent long-
term “dependency” on the welfare system. The proposed approach aims to extend payment 
beneficiaries obligations to the State, in “work for the dole” activities and broader mutual 
obligation schemes, to incorporate disability payment areas (Newman, 2000; Saunders, 2004). 
 
Whilst the aim of earlier governments in Australia, was a commitment toward full employment, 
for example during the post-war period, the 1945 White Paper entitled Full Employment in 
Australia was introduced (Boreham, Dow & Leet, 1999; Langmore & Quiggin, 1994; Standing, 
2002), successive governments, such as the Howard Government, have abandoned this notion 
(Saunders, 1998). This is an important consideration in terms of contextualising debates on 
employment, labour market participation, people with a disability and income support. 
 
The Howard Government’s “Mutual Obligation Initiative in Australia”, as noted by Goodin (2002), 
is the most highly convoluted system in the world; particularly so when compared with similar 
changes to employment and income support systems in western industrial countries (for 
example, workfare in the United States of America) (p. 582). Goodin further argued that 
compliance driven requirements based on notions of reciprocity becomes a contract under 
duress in which the recipient will “repay their dole payments with some very specific thing: 
labour time, spent in one of the prescribed activities [unpaid or paid caring labour or 
conservationist related task]” (p. 589). Breaching within the social security system comprises 
both administrative and activity test related requirements, including the failure to attend 
employment interviews and failure to consent to an activity agreement (Moses & Sharples, 
2000). 
 
Implementing punitive work activity tests is based on the assumption that an individual will 
actively “participate and contribute” something back to society (Goodin, 2001, 2002). This notion 
has had a long history in social policy and welfare provision. Akin to the Poor Laws, this level of 
paternalism deriving from the state, is confined solely to people who require some form of 
income support to maintain an adequate standard of living, for example, the poor (paupers), 
people who are unemployed, single parents and people with a disability (Goodin, 1988, 2001; 
Stretton, 1996; Tomlinson, 2000a). Generating causation relationships by linking inequality to 
so-called idleness and worklessness, further perpetuates and entrenches victim blaming 
attitudes within the community. 
 
Although this section has provided a brief overview of the literature concerning the historical 
developments and ideological dimensions of the Australian income support system, it can be 
seen that there is a gap in comparative research and literature when it comes to issues of 
disability and income support. Such an examination requires consideration of income support in 
relation to people with a disability and is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
Tracing the Patterns of Income Support for People with a Disability within Australia 
 
 
The Commonwealth Invalid Pension was instigated in 1909 under the Invalid and Old-age 
Pensions Act 1908. This pension was designed to provide people categorised as incapacitated 
or unable to work due to an impairment, with an income maintenance benefit (Beresford, 1996; 
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Jordan, 1984). Essentially, it was a historically relevant form of income support, that is, the 
Invalid and Old-age Pension was modelled on the New Zealand non-contributory scheme 
(1898) (Daniels, 2004; Jordan, 1984). This Australian pension model was considered ground 
breaking in its time as few countries, apart from New Zealand and Denmark (1891), had 
instigated a non-contributory and non-discretionary program that provided income assistance to 
people (Daniels, 2004, Jordan, 1984; Kennett, 2001). Yet notably, the Invalid Pension was 
subject to means testing. This meant that tight restrictions were imposed on the eligibility of 
people, including people in benevolent asylums and charitable institutions. Specific groups 
within society were marginalised and prevented from accessing the pension. This is 
demonstrated in the eligibility criteria, which specified that “groups excluded … were those living 
overseas, ‘aliens’, overseas born ‘asiatics’, and ‘aboriginal natives’ [sic] of Australia, Africa, The 
Pacific Islands or New Zealand” (Daniels, 2004, p. 10). In the circumstance that people with a 
disability were in an asylum or workhouse, payments were advanced to the institutions as an 
“act of grace” (Daniels, 2004). People entering ‘insane asylums’ had their invalid pension 
suspended until the point at which they were discharged (Daniels, 2004; Jordan, 1984). 
 
In selective approaches, such as the Invalid Pension, the criteria for eligibility are based on 
medical/physical conditions and psychological factors that prevented an individual’s participation 
in and contribution to the labour market (Beresford, 1996). Individual impairments were 
considered to be quantifiable measures, whilst social features, for example barriers and 
discrimination, were viewed as a less precise measure for determining disability (Contra is 
Perry, 1995; Goodin, 2001). Given the difficulties in constructing societal categories as absolute 
measures, categories of disability tended to focus on personal deficiencies and individual 
attributes or characteristics, thus pathologising and stigmatising people with a disability. One of 
the distinguishing features of the Invalid Pension is that these categories focused solely on the 
“permanent nature of disability” and the presumed incapacity or inability for an individual to 
return to the workforce or participate in general society. 
 
The Disability Support Package Legislation introduced in 1991 by the Keating Labor 
Government, superseded the Invalid Pension with the Disability Support Pension (Daniels, 
2004). In shifting from a passive entitlement system, this benefit centred on generating an active 
support provision payment for people with a long-term or permanent disability who are unable to 
work full-time for a period two years and beyond (Cook, 2004; Daniels, 2004; Sherry, 2002). 
This income support system of payment was selective, primarily situated within needs based 
entitlement models. Ideological similarities can be evidenced between the Invalid Pension and 
Disability Support Pension benefits, for example values associated with addressing need. 
However, what distinguishes the Invalid Pension from the Disability Support Pension is that the 
Invalid Pension focused solely on the “permanent nature of disability” and the presumed 
“incapacity” or inability for an individual to return to the workforce. Alternatively, given the 
historical changes in welfare support and labour market, the Disability Support Pension became 
a mechanism to enhance and promote active employment related participation; “reciprocal 
obligation” (Cook, 2004), reduce long-term social welfare expenditure in income support and 
lower the perceived dependency levels on income support payments. 
 
People obtaining the Disability Support Pension tended to be (and continue to be) subjected to 
stringent incomes and assets’ tests. Included within these means tests are regular reviews of 
people with a disability in receipt of the Disability Support Pension as a means for determining 
whether eligibility was maintained and that the disability prevented the individual from attaining 
long-term employment (Sherry, 2002; Tomlinson, 2000a). Goodin’s (2001) theoretical analysis 
explored the causal link of productivity and disability by drawing on the works of de Gerando 
(On Public Charity, 1839, cited in Goodin, 2001) which stated, “when an able-bodied pauper is 
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not employed, or when he [sic] is not employed to his full capacity, he [sic] must be given help in 
the form of work, and only in that form … if society must assist the unfortunate, it owes nothing 
to the idle” (p. 189). In short, from this position, some form of work incentive is required for 
people with a disability, to prevent idleness and dependency on the income support system. 
 
The proposed Howard Government’s policy of extending the work requirements to include 
disability contains neo-liberal assumptions around the assumed large numbers of people 
receiving the Disability Support Pension. Newman (2000) stated that people with a disability 
were failing to “take advantage” of services, such as specialist disability services and employer 
incentive schemes. These initiatives, according to Newman, provide assistance for increased 
participation in the labour market and general community (Tomlinson, 2000b). Saunders (2004) 
pointed to the expected saving of $1 billion each year that could be generated from shifting 
people off the Disability Support Pension and onto Newstart allowance. 
 
 
The disability construct, selectivism and the social model 
 
 
The social model of disability contends that the concept of disability is tied to the capitalist mode 
of production. Galvin (2004) pointed out that the field of disability studies is underpinned by 
values, which stress the importance of acknowledging the link between historical 
understandings and contemporary conceptualisations of disability and work. The English Poor 
Laws of the 1800s defined people in terms of their capacity to participate in the labour market 
and subsequent policies have maintained the link to employment and functioning in the labour 
market, as in sheltered workshops and employment participation schemes (Russell, 2001; 
Thomas, 1999). 
 
It has been identified that within Australia, the Invalid and Old-age Pensions Act 1908, sought to 
provide welfare relief by designating disability categories based notions of incapacity or inability 
to participate in the labour market as a result of impairment (Argyrous & Neale, 2000, p. 6, 
2003). The link between disability, labour market participation and capitalism requires further 
analysis. Capitalism advances through the generation of social forces that promote the 
principles of a societal system based on increased competition, marketisation and 
individualisation and monopolisation (Oliver, 1998, p. 33). The critical point is that the way work 
is organised around the principles of profit maximisation and competition leads to the social 
formation of inequitable relations, excluding specific groups from the labour market, particularly 
people with disability. 
 
An inherent contradiction is in the use of terms independence, participation and access, 
concepts that are central to disability movement and adopted by the current Government to 
promote the so-called welfare reforms (Galvin, 2004; Standing, 2002). Independence for the 
disability movement refers to attaining an adequate standard of living through increased 
participation and access to necessary social resources (Galvin, 2004). Yet, the disability 
activists and theorists (for example, Abberley, 1998 and Swain, French and Cameron, 2003) 
also challenged the notion of independence and prefer the term interdependence in recognition 
of the interconnectedness of social relationships between people. The Howard Government’s 
use of the term, independence is closely linked to self-reliance, that is, the capacity to do for 
oneself, without assistance from the state. Galvin (2004) pointed out that participation and 
access in the sense of the disability movement concerns rights, citizenship and social justice in 
which an individual is not linked solely to economic ideals of productive participation. 
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Under the Howard Government, participation is tied to mutual obligation, in which recipients of 
income support payments are expected to contribute to society by participating in work for the 
dole schemes and give back to society. Galvin (2004) highlighted that whilst the disability 
movement emphasises structural change and job creation schemes, participation for the 
Howard Government reflects conditional participation in low waged or unpaid work (p. 348), and 
labour market. The Government’s approach addressing unemployment and poverty through 
coercive means (mutual obligation), according to Galvin, is underpinned by economic 
fundamentalism and liberal individualism. Thus, from this stance, the focus is on “individual 
behavioural change” rather than changes to the social and structural conditions (p. 346). 
 
The focus on the individual linked to the notion of employment and productivity is linked to 
capacity for independence, citizenship and a positive social status (Galvin, 2004). The 
assumption is that there is full employment and people with a disability have unrestricted access 
to the labour market without any functional and structural barriers. This assumption fails to 
consider the historical antecedents of oppression and exclusion of people with a disability (for 
example, relegation to poor houses and asylums), rapid rise in unemployment in the context of 
an increasingly global labour market, rapid advances in technological innovation and decrease 
in public sector (Langmore & Quiggin, 1994; Stilwell, 1994, 2002; Wheelright, 1994). As Galvin 
noted “there are not enough jobs to go around, and secondly, some people simply cannot work 
because of the nature of their illness or impairment” (p. 351). 
 
Galvin (2004) further argued that “by appearing to share in a disability rights agenda, welfare 
reform policy has managed to maintain an air of empowerment, while stripping away the 
protective structure which, since 1908, has served to ensure that disabled Australians have 
received at least some level of income support in recognition of their additional needs” (p. 352). 
She argued that while there are limitations to the social model, the current government’s 
category of disability, that is reclassification into Newstart, turns disability into an economic and 
charity concept of a “disadvantaged jobseeker”. This then becomes a perpetuation and 
reinforcement of traditional individual models of disability. Galvin further noted that 
recategorising disability leads to the mainstreaming of people with a disability. Thus, whilst 
people with a disability are viewed paternalistically as being included and job ready, they have 
no actual rights attached to determining the types and choice of jobs. Standing (2002) identified 
that the shift in language, reflects “welfare reformers” language (p. 174), which is tied to notions 
of deserving and undeserving poor (p. 130, p. 13). 
 
The income support system has been a key component in the disablement process and source 
of oppression for people with a disability. This outcome is due in part from the stringent eligibility 
criteria and the development of erroneous distinctions between the types and forms of disability 
(for example, people with paraplegia and “blind pensioners”). Not only do assumptions, such as 
“individual actions contributing to poverty” (Abbott, cited in Marris, 2001), “dole bludger”, non-
performer and “genuinely seeking work” (Brough, 2001), influence the broader community’s 
perception of people who are unemployed, but also people with a disability. Thus, the 
underlying economic fundamentalist principles, generate and reinforce stereotypical and 
prejudicial assumptions about what is considered valued and good behaviour, and epitomise 
certain social norms valued in society, particularly in relation to people with a disability. 
 
The selective approach has been the dominant model for the Australian income support 
provision to people with a disability. Selective approaches have also become legitimised and 
upheld as the ideal. If we understand the implications of selectivism on people with a disability, 
based on Galvin’s arguments, then an examination of an alternative to discern relevancy is 
required. 
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Basic Income as an Alternative 
 
 
A Basic Income is an universal and unconditional grant that is provided to all (on an individual 
basis), and has no means testing, targeting, selectivity or work requirements attached to the 
payment (Basic Income European Network [BIEN], 2005; Standing, 2004a). The Basic Income 
approach draws on several principles, which distinguish it from selectivism. These include, the 
notions that adequate socio-economic security is the foundation for attaining real freedom; 
policies, which are socially just, contribute to reducing the insecurity of vulnerable, marginalised 
and oppressed groups in society; and socially just policies do not impose restrictions, controls or 
obligations on particular groups, which are not imposed on the most free groups in society, and 
promote the autonomy of people to pursue liberty and self-determination (Standing 2004a). 
 
A critical point is that Basic Income is paid irrespective of any income received from other 
sources and is a right without specific obligations (Standing 2004a). Theoretical analyses in 
support of Basic Income, such as Baker (1992) Van Parijs (2000), recognised that the approach 
is a relevant alternative to traditional selective income support systems, for contemporary 
society. Counter challenges to these Basic Income theorists include Barry (1992) and Offe 
(1992). They suggested that people should not be enforced to subsidise “voluntary 
unemployment” if so-called unemployed people failed to provide a productive contribution to 
society. Although somewhat supporting a Basic Income, Phelps (2000) rejected Van Parijs’ 
claims for a universal grant and proposed a low-wage employment subsidy as a means for 
ensuring people remain productive and linked to employment. These assumptions are counter 
to the principle of Basic Income as a universal right in its purest form. 
 
Critically, a Basic Income that is universal would not be stigmatising or categorising to peopke 
with a disability. This is because there would be no stringent eligibility criteria on the basis of 
disability categories as a qualifier for receiving income support. Whereas, the Australian 
selective approach of income support generates categories on the basis of “ableness” as a 
condition of citizenship and inclusion, a Basic Income grant is unconditional and a form of 
guaranteed minimum income (Standing, 2002, 2004b). The Australian selective income support 
system reinforces disabilism through its categorisation and separation of disability pensions 
from other payments, which leads to the creation of “artificial distinctions” (noted by Chouinard 
and Crooks, 2005; and Galvin, 2004). 
 
Standing’s (2004b) insight into Basic Income as a redistributive category and as a social and 
economic right, is useful in that he suggested “everybody needs a sense of basic security in 
order to function rationally, in order to be responsible, in order to develop competencies and 
capabilities” (p. 2). This assertion contrasts with mutual obligation, which equates 
unemployment with irresponsibility. Basic Income is a necessary condition for a right to work or 
occupation. Standing’s theoretical analysis explores the concepts “work” and “labour”, and 
questions the construct “right to work”. Standing identified that the right to work argument 
advanced by Harvey (2004) generates distinctions between so-called “able bodied” and 
“unabled” which is against the principles underpinning Basic Income (p. 7). This dichotomy put 
forward by Harvey, Standing argued, aligns with deserving and undeserving distinctions and 
leads to accepting the wisdom of selectivity and conditionality in the provision of income 
support, even when supporting Basic Income. A notion, Standing (2004b) pointed out, that is 
traditionally rejected by Basic Income advocates. 
 
Highlighting the strong deterministic assumption underpinning the right to work argument, 
Standing stated that: 
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Another, less-noted aspect of any distinction between ability and inability to work is that it 
treats people and work as rigidly determined, whereas even for a highly-impaired 
(handicapped) person accommodating modifications to work places could transform a barrier 
into an opportunity…. By establishing a sharp distinction, a policymaker would set up moral 
hazards, giving an incentive to some people to become or stay ‘unable to work’ in order to gain 
or retain conditional benefits. The distinction is a threat to fairness and to neutrality of social 
policy. (p. 7) 
Thus, basic income could constitute an adequate income provision on the basis of social and 
citizenship rights, rather than on the basis of a “proven” disability (Tomlinson, 2001b). Yet, this 
paper represents initial explorations into the Australian income support provision for people with 
a disability. Further exploration and testing is required to assist in determining the adequacy of 
the selective and universal approaches in relation to the disability construct and income support 
for people with a disability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The selective method underpinning the Australian income support provision to people with a 
disability has traditionally been the dominant approach. Whilst alternatives have been proposed 
(for example, the Whitlam Government in the 1970s explored the relevance of guaranteed 
minimum income), to date, within Australia, these different approaches have not been adopted. 
This leads to questions of adequacy concerning the selective income support system for people 
with a disability adopted in Australia. The assumptions of each approach require testing through 
critical historical policy analysis as a means to measure the comparisons, particularly the 
competing ideological dichotomies of selectivism and universalism underpinning both 
approaches. The ideological and historical features require further analysis to identify processes 
that lead to the predominance of one model over another approach. Given that the proposed 
changes to the disability income support system, by the current Howard Government, will come 
into effect in mid 2006, it becomes critical to determine the adequacy of the Australian selective 
income support system and an alternative, Basic Income. Key insights into income support 
policy relating to disability can be drawn which contributes to our understanding of the issues of 
dominance, adequacy of income support systems, implications for people with a disability and 
the prevailing ideology. As Standing (2004a) noted, “we live in an era of selectivity, 
conditionality and paternalistic controls that are a threat to real freedom…. Society … need not 
be like that. There is an alternative” (p. 7).  
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